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In the discussion about the structure and evolution of financial systems, the US
separated and the German universal banking system are commonly considered as
antipodes. This paper shows that the differences in the role of banks in these two
economies are less pronounced than the conventional wisdom suggests. Further-
more, prevailing differences can be explained by a number of factors other than
banking regulations. Hence, the distinction which is commonly drawn between uni-
versal and separated banking systems can be misleading and tends to underrate the
ongoing convergence between the systems. [89 words]
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The world's financial markets have been characterized by drastic changes over the
past two decades: Technical improvements, financial innovations, and the liberaliza-
tion of financial markets have intensified cross-border competition and promoted the
globalization of financial services. These changes, together with the regulatory re-
forms which are currently at stake in Europe, in the United States (US), and in a
number of emerging market economies have kindled the discussion whether there
exists a first-best financial system. If this were the case, a shift towards the dominant
system would increase welfare in the countries that operate under a different sys-
tem.
2
Conventional wisdom suggests that (universal) banks dominate the German, bank-
based financial system. Specialized US banks, in contrast, play a less pronounced
role in the US American, market-based financial system.
3 The discussion about the
advantages and disadvantages of the respective system is rather controversial, and,
as a result, one or the other system is favored, as if these two systems were mutually
exclusive. Studying the structure and evolution of these two financial systems can
thus provide useful insights for policy decisions and theoretical studies alike.
This paper attempts to show (i) which differences, between the German and the US
financial system actually exist and (ii) what underlying factors can explain these dif-
ferences. Of course, this is not the first study to compare the structure of financial
systems. Some previous surveys (Borio, 1995; Corbett/Jenkinson, 1996; Ra-
jah/Zingales, 1995) have shown that some basic features of bank- and market-based
financial systems do not differ as much as is commonly believed - or at least that a
simple classification of financial systems is not possible. The present paper sets it-
self apart from these earlier cross-country studies because it takes a more narrowly
defined approach. It focuses only on two financial systems - the German and the US
-, and it mainly restricts itself to the role of banks in the process of financial inter-
Some sections of this paper draw on Brichs Serra/Nienaber (1996). The authors would
like to thank Ralph P. Heinrich for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
However, if the structure of a financial system depends on its evolution over time, i.e., if
path-dependence prevails, then a country cannot simply adopt a new system.
Note that this standard classification is not always clear cut. In the United Kingdom, for
example, banks play a relatively important role, while the financial system^is typically
characterized as market-based.mediation. Special attention is paid to the financing of small firms and to the function
of equity participations of banks in non-financial firms. Hence, the paper allows for a
more detailed analysis of institutional factors and of differences in financial struc-
tures.
Our results show that the role of banks is actually not that much different in the two
economies. Apart from banking regulations, distinctions in tax regimes, in bankruptcy
legislation, in the pension systems, and not least in accounting systems have a sig-
nificant impact on the structure of financial markets that we can observe. These dif-
ferences become smaller over time as a result of the ongoing international competi-
tion among regulatory frameworks and due to a trend towards universally accepted
supervision standards.
4 Consequently, we expect the systems to converge to a sys-
tem with less regulated financial markets than the German ones and a less regulated
banking system than the US one. Our findings have important policy implications for
regulatory reforms in Germany and in the US. In Germany, improving the allocation
of financial funds, first of all, requires overall changes of the institutional framework
of financial markets rather than limitations to the operations of banks. In the US, lib-
eralizing banking regulations may be desirable to strengthen the role of banks in the
corporate governance of firms. In short, universal versus separated banking may be
the wrong dichotomy. Quite to the contrary, the optimal financial system combines
features of bank- and market-based systems.
Section 2 summarizes the main aspects of banking regulations in Germany and in
the US and outlines the current reform proposals. In Section 3, we briefly lay down
some basic theoretical considerations on the role of financial intermediaries and de-
scribe the stylized structure of bank- and market-based financial systems. Section 4
develops four hypotheses on the structure of the German and the US financial sys-
tems and provides empirical evidence to check the validity of these hypotheses.
Section 5 concludes.
4 A case in point of the latter are the rules of the Bank for International Settlements
which, nevertheless, still allow for national discretion. For details see Hall (1992).6
2. CHANGING BANKING REGULATIONS: THE OPEN POLEMIC
A series of banking crises in the US during the 1980s, and public discontent about
the alleged power of German banks have motivated discussions about regulatory
reforms in both countries. This section briefly reviews the current legal structures and
outlines the major reform proposals.
2.1. US Banking regulations
The US banking system is, as a result of specific historical circumstances, highly
regulated (Lewis/Pescetto, 1996: 72n).
5 Basically, we can differentiate between re-
strictions concerning the type of business and geographic restrictions (Table 1).
US commercial banks were allowed to directly provide investment banking services,
i.e., to underwrite and to invest into certain types of securities, from 1812 until the
end. of the 19th century. Afterwards, these services had to be provided through se-
curities affiliates (Saunders/Walter, 1994: 85). Besides, in 1914, restrictions were
imposed on the membership of bankers in the board of directors of firms (Calomiris,
1993). Hence, even before the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, there was
no truly universal banking system in the US. Within the limits to their activities, how-
ever, universal banks prior to 1933 did achieve relatively good results (Kroszner,
1996). In particular, securities underwritten by commercial banks tended to outper-
form those underwritten by investment banks.
As a reaction to the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act imposed the separa-
tion between commercial and investment banking in order to isolate commercial
banks from the risk of the securities business, to avoid the concentration of financial
power, and to minimize conflicts of interest. Other, such as geographical, restrictions
were not introduced by the Act but rather confirmed (Roe, 1994: 94). Market forces
worked, however, to circumvent the separation between commercial and investment
banking because bank holding companies, which owned both commercial and in-
vestment banks, were founded. As a counteraction, the Bank Holding Companies
Act of 1956 prohibited bank holding companies from owning equity in non-financial
firms. However, prohibiting only the holding of two or more companies gave rise to
5 For a more detailed description of the US banking system see Moschel (1978).7
one-bank holding companies. This, in turn, led to an amendment of the Bank Holding
Companies Act in 1970 (Prowse, 1996: 8n).
6
As far as geographic restrictions are concerned, legislation of the federal states and
of the confederation restricted US commercial banks from inter-state branching. With
regard to intra-state branching, one can - ranked by a decreasing degree of freedom
- roughly differentiate between state-wide branching, limited branching, and unit
banking. As in the case of business restrictions, group banking via bank holding
companies also helped to circumvent the intra-state constraints.
While the restrictions on the activities and geographic expansion of banks were
aimed at stabilizing the banking sector, they have not - perhaps not very surprisingly
- shielded the US banking system from systemic crises. During the 1980s, the num-
ber of bank failures in the US increased dramatically. There were three main reasons
for these failures: (i) regional crises, because the performance of banks was strongly
tied to regional growth due to the inability to diversify geographically, (ii) insider trade,
which was caused by failures in the market of corporate control, and (iii) the deposit
insurance system which contributed to moral hazard behavior of the Savings and
Loans Associations. As a response to the bank failures, the US American regulatory
authorities started deregulating the banking industry in the mid-1980s. The Federal
Reserve Board allowed 39 US and foreign banks to establish subsidiaries to conduct
limited securities activities (Borsen-Zeitung, 1996). As these banks represent an ex-
ception, authorized by the Fed, to Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, they are also
labeled "Section-20-Banks". But still, legislation continues to be rather restrictive:
7
The limit on the revenues from the investment banking activities of the subsidiaries
has in December 1995 been raised from 10 to 25 percent of the parent bank's total
revenues, employees and directors are not allowed to work in both activities, and
banks may not assist to market the activities of their subsidiaries.
Since 1989, 43 states allow state-wide branching, albeit to different degrees
(Lewis/Pescetto, 1996: 80). In 1995, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
6 A former amendment in 1S66 did not incorporate one-bank holding companies.
7 The remaining barriers are justified as "fire-walls" that protect the whoie company from
the risks of the securities business.Branching Efficiency Act removed nearly all barriers for banks to expand their busi-
ness to. other states. This has already triggered a major process of consolidation,
mergers, and acquisitions in the US banking industry. As for now, complete geo-
graphical liberalization is scheduled for June 1997 (Muller, 1995).
The regulatory system that was intended to reduce the probability of bank bankrupt-
cies in the 1930s has proven ineffective in the 1990s (Benston, 1990: 318n). It has
thus been argued that removing the existing regulatory barriers would enable banks
to spread risks and to allow for greater competition, which, in turn, would lead to a
more efficient allocation of capital. Saunders and Walter (1994: 204) made a simula-
tion analysis for US banks and found that there are potential risk-reductions for the
banks by increasing the scope of their activities, and that these reductions are the
greater the larger the number of activities undertaken. The most relevant risk-
reduction arises from banks expanding into the insurance rather than into the securi-
ties business. The big controversy in the US today is how the necessary deregula-
tory reform should take place. There are three basic proposals (Waters, 1995; Grun,
1995; Muller, 1995):
1.-To
!-allow banking groups to enter into the insurance and securities business
through subsidiaries, and to allow commercial companies, to own banks, and vice
versa-. As the most liberal proposal, it implies the end of the separated banking
system.
2. To allow banking groups to own not only banks, but also securities companies.
This is the least liberal proposal, which basically abrogates Section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act.
3. To allow banks to own investment banks and insurance companies, but not to al-
low non-financial companies to own banks (or vice versa). As the administration's
proposal, it represents a compromise of the first two proposals.
Which of these proposals will be implemented and how the future of the US Ameri-
can banking system will evolve is yet undetermined. To what degree liberalization
will finally take place is still under controversial discussion in the US. However, all
these alternatives mean a step away from a separated banking system towards a
universal banking system. Only in January, 1997, the insurance agent's lobby agreedthat banks and insurance companies should be allowed to own each other - thus re-
versing a position it has held since the 19th century (The Economist, .1997).
2.2. German Banking regulations
The German banking system is defined by most authors as universal, although some
legal restrictions prevent all banks from operating as universal banks.
8 The Spar-
kassen (Savings Banks), in particular, which accounted for almost 20 percent of the
banking system's assets at the end of 1996,
9 are restricted in the scope of their ac-
tivities and in their regional expansion. Generally speaking, universal banking can
be defined as the conduct of a range of financial services comprising deposit-taking
and lending, trading of financial instruments and foreign exchange (and their deriva-
tives), underwriting of new debt and equity issues, brokerage, investment manage-
ment, and insurance (Saunders/Walter, 1994: 84).
1
0 Furthermore, German banks
can hold shares in non-financial firms. Generally, a bank's investments - including
shares and participations - may not exceed its liable capital. This restriction does
not apply to participations in other firms which do not exceed 10 percent of the firm's
capital, securities which are only held for trading purposes and which account for
less than 5 percent of the firm's capital, shares which the bank does not hold for
longer than two years, and shares which a bank has acquired to avoid losses in the
lending business for a maximum period of 5 years (Zerwas, 1996: E18n). In addition
to their shareholdings in nonfinancial firms, German banks hold seats in the supervi-
sory boards of firms and exercise proxy voting on behalf of their private customers.
They have thus a large potential to perform corporate control functions.
8 Restrictions to universal banking activities are mainly based on the Mortgage Banks
Law (from 1899, last amended in 1988), the Home Owner's Loan Act (from 1931, last
amended in 1972) and the Laws on Public Savings and Giro Banks of the Lander. For
a more detailed discussion see Hahn (1995: 1n), and Kregel (1992: 245n).
9 This number has been calculated from the monthly report of the Deutsche Bundesbank
(January 1997).
1
0 In a fully comprehensive sense, universal banking should also include the issuing of
money. But in reality, such a comprehensive universal banking system does not exist
any more. The only exceptions are the centrally planned economies of Cuba and North
Corea where the central bank has the monopoly on all banking activities (socialist'
"monobank" systems) (Hahn, 1995:2). However, in these countries, the banking sys-
tem plays an entirely different role than in a market-type economy.10
The intense competition for internationally mobile capital and the failures - or near-
failures - of several well-known German companies in the recent past have called
into question the efficiency of the German banking system. The dual role of banks as
creditors and shareholders has called forth a public debate on the power of banks.
These concerns are mainly prompted by the fact that by relying on a bank as a fi-
nancial intermediary to solve the principal-agent problem at the corporate level, one
creates a new principal-agent problem at the intermediation level (Baums, 1993:
48n). As in the US, there are several proposals how to change the German financial
system (FAZ, 1996; Schroeder/Schrader, 1996: 9n):
1. According to the government's proposal, the number of board members shall be
limited, banks shall not be allowed to exercise their own votes and the proxy votes
of their customers if they hold more than 5 percent of an enterprise's shares.
2. The proposal made by the opposition goes even further. It intends to prohibit
banks to own mutual funds, to abrogate the system of proxy-votes, and to restrict
equity holdings in non-financial firms to 5 percent.
An evolution towards a more developed financial system and a more specialized
banking business has, in fact, already started. The current trend in Germany is to set
up specialized subsidiaries or to buy specialized banks, mergers of larger German
banks are being discussed, and some commercial banks have moved their invest-
ment banking operations to foreign financial centers.11
3. THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
A number of factors contribute to the endogenous emergence of financial intermedi-
aries. Asymmetries in information which create a demand for risk reduction and in-
formation gathering through intermediaries feature prominently. This section briefly
summarizes the main arguments and shows how bank- and market-based financial
systems fulfill these tasks.
3.1. The case for financial intermediation
Nowadays, unanimity seems to prevail among economists that financial systems are
a relevant variable influencing investment and, therefore, economic growth.
1
1 The
question which particular financial system - bank- or market-based - brings about
higher welfare, however, cannot be answered equally unanimously. The role of both
banks and financial markets consists in the transformation of savings into invest-
ment, i.e., in matching suppliers of capital and investors. On one side of the market,
there are companies seeking to raise external finance. On the other side, there are
providers of capital such as households and large institutions like pension funds,
mutual funds, and insurance companies, looking for investment opportunities.
Matching these two sides of the market can be achieved through issuing debt and/or
equity either directly in the financial markets or indirectly through banks and other fi-
nancial intermediaries (Hein, 1988: 252). •
Due to the risks that the transformation of capital involves on part of the lender, fi-
nancial systems have to assume two basic, interdependent functions: risk sharing
and information gathering (Black/Moersch, 1996: 3). Risks can result from the pos-
sibility of needing cash before maturity (liquidity risk) and from the possibility of not
recovering: the money invested {investment risk). The two potential sources of in-
vestment risk are pure uncertainty and principal-agent behavior. Whereas the former
has its cause in the uncertainty of nature (uncertainty risk), the latter results from
asymmetric information, i.e., either from hidden information (adverse selection or ex
1
1 Recently, there has been a series of studies showing that the financial system of a
country is significant for investment and growth. For a survey see King and Levine
(1993). Lucas (1988), in contrast, argues that financial development is relatively unim-
portant for economic growth.12
ante asymmetric information) or from hidden action (moral hazard or ex post asym-
metric information).
The hidden information problem arises because a company which seeks outside fi-
nance as an agent has private information about the riskiness of its projects. Inves-
tors as principals will only learn about the quality of the firm after signing the contract
(Akerlof, 1970), or not even then.
1
2 In order to get the contract signed; the agent has
thus an incentive to hide detrimental information (hidden information risk). In the
case of hidden action, the project outcome not only depends on the agent's action
but also: on exogenous factors, both of which are unobservable. As a consequence,
project results cannot automatically be related to the agent's performance - bad luck
and bad performance can actually lead to the same outcome (Arrow, 1984). This
makes the agent reduce his effort at the principal's expense (hidden action risk). The
principal-agent problem becomes more grave the more anonymous the investor re-
lationship is, and different financial systems employ different instruments to reduce
these risks.
If markets are perfectly competitive and if information can be obtained at relatively
low costs such as in an Arrow-Debreu world (Arrow, 1964; Debreu, 1959), a system
of direct finance via the financial markets is efficient
1
3 and will emerge. However, in
the presence of market imperfections such as asymmetries in information, the direct
allocation of capital may become either impossible or inefficient.
1
4 Financial inter-
mediaries such as banks thus receive an important role because they: operate as
delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984), hereby reducing transaction cost of savers
which arise from the need to collect information.
Up to now, we have outlined the role and the functions of financial systems in gen-
eral. In a further step, we want to see how a market-based financial system with its
1
2 Whether the principal gets to know this ex ante hidden information depends heavily on
the properties of the underlying good. According to Nelson (1970: 31 An), search and
experience goods can be distinguished; Darby and Kami (1973: 68) introduced the
term of credence quality. Because the investment relationship is characterized by ex-
perience and trust as a credence quality, ex post, it is at least costly or even impossible
to reveal ex ante hidden information.
1
3 Nowadays, the assumption of capital markets efficiency in its semi-strong form is gen-
erally accepted. It implies that share prices reflect all freely available information.
1
4 Although there may ..exist other market imperfections which cause transaction costs
such as the spatial separation of agents (Hellwig 1994: 2n), we will focus on the prob-
lems resulting from asymmetries in information in the remaining part of the paper.specialized banks and a universal banking system accomplish the functions of in-
formation gathering and risk sharing.
3.2. Market-based financial systems
In a market-based system, the two functions risk sharing and information gathering
are mainly carried out via capital markets. Each investor diversifies his risk indi-
vidually. In order to make the right investment decision, investors have to gather a
substantial amount of information about the different investment possibilities. Be-
cause information is not freely available,
1
5 and because the value of the information
obtained can only be determined afterwards ("information paradox"), a single inves-
tor can eventually find the information gathering process-too costly and abstain from
the highly anonymous capital market.
1
6 To avoid that result but rather to facilitate
the match between suppliers and consumers of capital, a market-based financial
system requires a substantial amount of publicly available information. Since prices
play an important role in conveying information, they must frequently adjust and thus
steadily reflect newly available information.
The availability of information reduces the hidden information risk. As a conse-
quence, the ex ante risk decreases, and more funds are channeled to the capital
markets. This leads to a greater liquidity and therefore minimizes the liquidity risk of
the investors as well as the uncertainty risk through the possibility of portfolio diver-
sification.
1
7 Yet, the hidden action risk remains. In a market-based system, the mar-
ket for corporate control serves as safeguard against adverse management action. If
ownership and control are separated, liquid markets are an important requisite for
the market for corporate control to work efficiently (Gorton/Schmid, 1996: 31). A
market-based system does not allows for noise suppression: Traditionally, the higher
volatility in such a system has been ascribed to the steady flow of new information
about payoff streams and discount rates, information that is made publicly available
(Allen/Gale, 1995: 195n). Hence, prices serve as signals of a company's perform-
1
5 At least, opportunity costs in terms of time incurred by gathering information have to be
taken into account.
1
6 The extreme case would be a failure of the capital market as Akerlof (1970) shows in
his famous example of the market for 'lemons'.
1
7 It should be clear that portfolio diversification only leads to a reduction in the unsys-
tematic risk whereas the systematic or market risk cannot fully be diversified away.14
ance. Low share prices as a signal of poor performance lead the market agents to
expect an increase in the shareholder value if a takeover takes place and if the cur-
rent managers are replaced by more efficient ones. This potential increase in share-
holder value creates incentives to make the bid. The threat of a takeover bid in case
of bad performance may force managers to concentrate on maximizing the short-run
value of their companies' shares.
3.3. Bank-based financial systems
In a bank-based financial system, banks assume the function of gathering informa-
tion and reducing the risk of investors.
1
8 Banks as financial intermediaries reduce li-
quidity risk by pooling across individuals with different liquidity preferences, and they
minimize uncertainty risk by diversifying across uncorrelated investments/They
lower the principal-agent problems by information gathering and by direct monitoring
of the agent's behavior. With banks as intermediaries, the market is no- longer
anonymous because banks have a close relationship to their clients and, conse-
quently, can acquire a reputation of providing reliable information.
Universal banks, in particular, are allowed to underwrite securities and to hold equity
in non-financial firms. This is the main characteristic which sets them apart from
separated banks. Instead of the market for corporate control, universal banks ac-
complish the function of corporate governance. The role of banks in corporate gov-
ernance is particularly relevant in publicly listed corporations with small scattered
shareholders. There are three channels through which universal banks as being si-
multaneously equity- and debtholder of a firm can exert corporate control functions
(Baums, 1993: 25n):
1. In the shareholder meetings, banks represent both their own shares and the
shares of those customers who delegated their votes (proxy votes).
2. Banks are the firm's "Hausbank", i.e., they are the exclusive providers of funds for
the firm (Allen/Gale, \J95: 184n).
1
8 If public information is not sufficiently available, banks - contrary to individuals - dis-
pose of the bargaining power that is necessary to impose signaling or self-selection
mechanisms.15
3. Banks have representatives on the board of their client-firms ("interlocking direc-
torates"). As the appointment and dismissal of management is a function of the
supervisory board, the supervisory board is an essential tool of corporate govern-
ance.
However, the impact of universal banks on the corporate governance of firms can be
double-edged:
On the one hand, the close relation between banks and companies is advantageous
for both sides. The companies benefit from improved access to external finance,
they can profit from the bank's expertise in financial affairs, and they are able to
concentrate more on their core business. The banks improve their information about
the company and, consequently, are able to control the managers more closely, thus
reducing the risk of managerial hazardous behavior (Baums, 1993: 22). The theory
of optimal corporate control suggests that debt holders should monitor a firm in bad
states of the world, and that equity holders should play this roie in good states of the
world (Dewatripont/Tirole, 1994: 140). Accordingly, banks which simultaneously are
debt- and shareholders are able to impose an optimal governance structure on non-
financial firms (Steinherr/Gilibert, 1994). Because of their informational advantage,
bank influence may outperform other arrangements of corporate governance. The
close relationship between banks and companies favors internal settlement of con-
flicts, i.e., voice, rather than external settlement through the market, i.e., exit
(Franks/Mayer, 1995: 187/i). This enables managers to focus on long-term strate-
gies: equity holdings remain stable, and so do the monitoring institutions. If there is
any short-term problem, it can be explained to the supervisory board rather than be-
ing signaled to the anonymous market (Chirinko/Elston, 1996a: 28n).
On the other hand, the fact that banks hold debt and equity of a company can lead to
conflicts of interest on the side of the bank and to inefficiencies on the side of the
firm if the firm becomes too dependent on its housebank. This dependence may
eventually decrease the firm's adaptability to changes. A takeover bid may be re-
pulsed with the help of the bank because of personal links, irrespective of the man-
agers' performance. Furthermore, the firm's management as well as its supervisory
board may become either unable or unwilling to take value-enhancing, but unpopular
decisions that are difficult to be implemented politically. In this case, the existence of
a market for corporate control would be more efficient (Baums, 1993: 55n). Conflicts16
of interest can furthermore arise between the commercial and investment banking
activities because information gained at commercial banking activities can be ex-
ploited in trading activities at the expense of retail investors. Generally, the fact that
equity holdings of banks may lead to conflicts of interest within the bank and thus
cause inefficiencies suggests that the optimal shareholdings of a bank in a firm may
be relatively small.
By holding equity of a firm and lending to the same firm, universal banks can exploit
economies of scope between different activities.
1
9 Apart from the enhanced ability to
monitor management, there are three reasons why banks may be interested in hold-
ing equity of non-financial firms:
• Berlin, John, and Saunders (1996) show that equity holdings of banks may be
necessary to ensure that banks and firms as informed insiders do not form coali-
tions at the expense of non-informed outside stakeholders as, for example, sup-
pliers. Because banks have an informational advantage over suppliers in evaluat-
ing the performance of firms, suppliers may consider to delegate the collection of
information to banks. Banks and firms, however, have incentives to form a coali-
tion against suppliers. If the firm is distressed, they may claim that the firms is
actually healthy. The supplier would then provide production inputs although it
would be optimal to close the firm. If the firm is healthy, the coalition may claim
that it is actually distressed, hence causing unnecessary (price) concessions from
the supplier. In order to align the interests of banks and outside stakeholders,
some claims of the banks should thus be subordinated to those of uninformed
stakeholders. The authors show that the only feasible way to achieve such a sub-
ordination may be a (small) equity stake of the bank in the firm which the bank
loses in the case of corporate financial distress.
• Petersen and Rajan (1994) argue that small firms would face difficulties in getting
access to bank lending unless banks can charge low early interest rates and get
1
9 Although such economies of scope are likely to exist from a theoretical point of view,
they are inherently difficult to detect empirically. See Berger/Hunter/Timrne (1993) for a
review of empirical studies. Lang and Welzel (1995) estimate cost functions of German
banks but cannot, due to data limitations, account for the effects of participations of
banks in firms. In addition, Calomiris (1993) argues that empirical methods used to de-
tect economies of scope tend to focus on the'cost savings for banks rather than wel-
fare implications for the banks' customers.17
compensated for these price concessions by charging higher interest rates once
the firms mature. Such state-contingent pricing of loans, however, is only feasible
in concentrated markets. In competitive markets, equity stakes of banks in firms
can instead serve as a substitute for lending relationships because they allow the
banks to share in future profits.
The above models show that it may be optimal for banks to hold small equity
stakes in financially healthy firms. The value of these equity stakes is reduced
substantially when the firms come into financial distress. In this situation, banks
may have incentives to swap some of their existing debt into equity. Such debt-to-
equity swaps may enable banks to retain an option value of waiting on their exist-
ing claims, to gain greater control over the actions of the distressed firm, and to
become more actively engaged in the restructuring of the firm.18
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF BANKS IN GER-
MANY AND IN THE US
If the US separated banking system and the German universal banking system are
really as different as it is often suggested, we would expect to find evidence for cer-
tain hypotheses. In this section we bring forward four hypotheses that we consider
particularly indicative.
1. Structure of financial systems: If the fact that German banks are allowed to oper-
ate as universal banks whereas US banks are confined to separated banking is
important, the structure and development of financial markets should differ signifi-
cantly between the two countries. Bank finance, for example, should be of greater
importance for German than for US firms.
2. Small firm finance: The structure of the financial system should in particular have
an impact on the financing of smali firms. Due to a lack of publicly available infor-
mation and thus the prevalence of substantial asymmetries in information, these
firms should face the greatest problems in obtaining external finance, and they
are most likely to be affected by credit rationing.
3. Banks and corporate governance: Universal banks are considered to exert a
strong influence on the corporate governance of firms through proxy voting, the
seats on supervisory boards that they hold, and through equity stakes in non-
financial firms. This influence of banks should affect the performance of firms. In
addition, we should find significant differences in the amount of equity holdings of
banks in non-financial firms in Germany and in the US.
4. Activities and profitability of commercial banks: Differences in banking regulations
and a different role of banks in the financial system should ultimately be reflected
in the structure of the banking system, i.e., in the balance sheet structure of
banks, in their income statements, and in their profitability.
4.1. Structure of financial systems
The different structure of bank- versus market-based financial systems should be re-
flected in the relative importance of financial intermediaries, and in differences in the
financial structures of firms.19
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
In fact, the US capital markets - both stock and bond markets - are highly devel-
oped. The rate of market capitalization in the stock market reaches a comparatively
high 64 percent of GDP, the number of publicly listed companies is large and contin-
ues to increase, and the market shows a comparatively low concentration: the ten
largest stock corporations account for only 14 percent of the market capitalization
(Table 2). The bond market also plays an important role, the main gross bond issu-
ers being the public authorities (57.6 percent), the financial sector (28.0 percent),
and domestic corporations (12.7 percent) (Table 3).
The German capital markets are much less developed and much more regulated
than those in the US: The stock market is less significant, there are only 551 listed
companies, the market capitalization rate amounts to only 24 percent of GDP, and
the market is much more concentrated with the ten largest stock corporations repre-
senting 41 percent of the market (Table 2). The bond market is more developed
(Allen/Gale, 1995: 183), but German non-financial firms have only a negligible share
in this market (0.2 percent) (Table 3). Like in the US, governments and banks are
the main issuers of bonds, even though in the reversed order of importance (24.1
percent and 75.7 percent, respectively). This underdevelopment of the German
capital markets can be related to the strictness of the regulatory system. For non-
financial firms, it is rather difficult to get access to the capital markets directly without
calling in financial intermediaries due to the amount of regulatory restrictions, many
of which, however; were removed in the early 1990s (Table 4). These adjustments
have prompted a gradual process towards financial disintermediation. Hence, a
process of securitization seems to be taking place in Germany.
2
0 The share of se-
curities in total debt finance (bank loans plus securities) has increased from 2 to 6
percent between 1983 and 1993 (Borio, 1995). In the US, in contrast, securities ac-
counted for 20 percent of debt finance in 1993 (1983: 17 percent).
2
0 The process of securitization can be observed on the international financial markets
since the early 1980s. It makes loans more fungible and may help to reduce the costs
of financing. As companies, therefore, may issue secured credits directly more easily -
basically via Euronote facilities and Euro commercial papers -, it changes the banks'
function.20
Despite legal changes intended to ease firms' access to the stock market, equity
markets in Germany are still underdeveloped, are mainly used by relatively large
firms, and most companies have not been affected by an upswing in IPOs (DBB,
1997). It is therefore interesting to note that in the period between 1870 and 1913
German firms were actually more successful in bringing equity to market, that they
faced lower cost of external equity finance than US firms, and that the average issu-
ance size was smaller in Germany than in the US (Calomiris, 1995). This lends some
support to the hypothesis that the high costs of raising equity finance in Germany
are not the result of an inherent bias of universal banks not to support firms' public
offerings. Rather, other regulatory factors are likely to have an impact on the financ-
ing decisions of firms.
With regard to stock market turnover and volatility, the German and the US financial
system are surprisingly similar (Table 2). Despite the substantial differences in mar-
ket capitalization, the total volume of traded shares does not differ essentially in both
countries with 41 percent of GDP in the US and 35 percent in Germany.
2
1 In addi-
tion, the 12-months rolling standard deviation estimate based on market returns
amounts to 0.03 for the US, and to 0.04 for Germany and is thus relatively similar.
CORPORATE FINANCE
As regards the financial structure of firms, the major difference appears to be the
greater leverage of German as compared to US firms (Rajan/Zingales, 1995: 1422).
Yet, although the debt/equity-ratio was higher in Germany than in the US in 1980
and in 1994, this ratio decreased in Germany from 1.75 to 1.51, whereas in the US it
increased from 0.47 to 1.07 over the same period. Even though there is still a con-
siderable gap, the difference thus decreased significantly.
2
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Borrowing from banks represented about 20 percent of non-financial German firms'
liabilities in 1994, and less than 17 percent of non-financial US firms. In 1980, it had
accounted for 21 percent in Germany versus less than 11 percent in the US
(Table 5). Thus, the difference apparently decreases as well. In German non-
financial firms, short-term dominate long-term liabilities, and this pattern does not
2
1 In other words, the turnover ratio is much lower in the US than in Germany.
2
2 It must be noted, in addition, that differences in accounting standards complicate a
simple comparison of balance sheet ratios (Rajan/Zingales, 1995).21
seem to have changed over the period from 1980 to 1994. As a whole, short-term li-
abilities have more weight in German non-financial firms than in US ones.
A comparison of the balance sheet structure of non-financial firms reflects the his-
torical financing patterns of the capital stock, not the financial sources used to fi-
nance current investment. Moreover, balance sheet figures are biased due to differ-
ences in accounting standards. Hence, an analysis of the sources of new finance
(flows of funds) may give a more accurate picture. Corbett and Jenkinson (1996)
provide such evidence, drawing on data provided by the Federal Reserve System
and the Deutsche Bundesbank. They compare the net sources of finance of firms for
four time periods, starting with the period 1970-74 through 1985-89. Hence, the data
are not directly comparable to the stock data because, for example, bank loans and
deposits are netted out. Their analysis reveals some interesting patterns:
• Internally generated sources contribute the bulk of financial sources for firms' in-
vestment both in the US and in Germany. The share of internal finance has even
increased from 74.5 to 103.7 percent in the US and from 68.9 to 89.1 percent in
Germany between the first and the last period.
• In the US, a decline in the importance of bank finance from 26.6 to 15.0 percent
has been accompanied by an increase in bond finance from 15.7 to 24.8 percent.
New equity issues have - in the aggregate - made a negative net contribution to
the financing of firms in the 1980s.
2
3 Hence, total market-based finance (bonds
plus new equity) has become less important in the US over the decades under
review.
• in Germany, bank finance has also lost in importance (15.7 versus 9.3 percent)
but this decline has not been accompanied by an increase in (direct) bond fi-
nance. Both bond finance and new equity issues are almost negligible in size.
2
4
Bank-based finance has rather been replaced by internally generated funds.
2
3 Interestingly, new equity issues have been far more important for the financing of US
firms in the first four decades of the century than afterwards. Until 1940, they contrib-
uted on average 16 percent to total financing, between 1940 and 1980 only 3 percent
(Singh/Hamid, 1992: 11).
2
4 Capital transfers, in contrast, have been a relatively important financing source for
German firms (about 9 percent on average). This-itenrcomprises-subsidies and internal
sources of finance of state-owned firms.22
In view of the large volume of directly raised external finance, it may appear that fi-
nancial intermediaries and in particular banks play only a limited role in the US.
Boyd and Gertler (1995), however, show that the importance of banks is measured
incorrectly if their off-balance sheet activities are not taken into account. They argue
that the shift of lending away from banks towards the commercial paper market has
been accompanied by back-up lines of credit and/or guarantees for most borrowers
on these markets. Also, banks often originate loans and sell them to other financial
institutions which implies that banks are still fulfilling most of their original functions.
Also Borio (1995: 73n) shows that formal (liquidity) back-up for commercial paper is
particularly significant in the US whereas jn Germany formal back-up agreements
are much less frequent.
In summary, the data do reveal that some differences in the financial structures of
firms dp exist but that these tend to become less pronounced over time. Besides,
different legal protection of creditor rights as well as differences in tax regimes ap-
pear to affect financing decisions at least as much as differences in banking regula-
tions, in Germany, for example, only unsecured creditors are stayed in a bankruptcy
proceeding; secured creditors have privileged access to the firm's assets
(Kaiser/Kaiser, 1993). In the US, bankruptcy under Chapter 11 implies an automatic
stay to be placed on all assets, i.e., secured creditors are affected as well. This re-
quires banks and non-bank creditors to agree on a debt restructuring and may cause
a reluctance to lend. Furthermore, since 1990 both debt finance through loans and
financing through retained earnings are favored over shares issues in Germany by
tax regulations (DBB, 1997).
4.2. Small firm finance
Apart from the corporate control problems of large firms, a second area where
asymmetries in information affect the structure and performance of financial markets
is the financing of small and, in particular, new firms. Unlike large existing enter-
prises, small new firms have a short or even no track record, they do not have to
publish their financial statements, and their activities may be more vulnerable than
those of large diversified firms. Because of the high fixed costs of screening small
loan applicants, banks may resort to sorting devices and collaterize small business
loans to a substantial degree. Because especially new firms are often collateral-23
constrained, they may be excluded from the credit market (Stiglitz/Weiss, 1981).




A priori, it is not evident to what extent the financing of small firms can be expected
to differ under universal versus separated banking. The mere fact that universal
banks are allowed to hold equity of non-financial firms and to underwrite securities
must not directly affect small firms' access to external finance. Since corporate con-
trol problems are of limited concern for small firms, the need to align management
and investors' interests does not arise and, hence, banks' equity holdings may not
be as relevant as for large firms. Similarly, because of the lack of publicly available
information and the high transaction costs involved in the analysis of small firms, this
group of enterprises is unlikely to raise substantial funds through the issuance of se-
curities. If differences between the financial structures of small firms in Germany and
in the US prevail, these may thus be the result of the overall institutional framework
of financial markets rather than of banking regulations. Still, it has been argued that
the move from separated to universal banking in the US would lead to mergers of
banks and to the creation of larger units. If lending by large banks is more transac-
tion- rather than relationship-driven as compared to lending by small banks, the
move to universal banking may thus indirectly imply a reduction in lending to small
business (Berger/Kashyap/Scalise, 1995; Berger/Udell, 1996),
GERMANY
For Germany, consistent evidence on the financial structure of small and mid-sized
firms is scarce because many of these firms are not required to publish their finan-
cial statements. The Deutsche Bundesbank (1992) has prepared a relatively com-
prehensive set of information on the financing sources of firms for the period 1978-
1989. The survey covers 18,000 firms from the Unternehmensbilanzstatistik of the
Deutsche Bundesbank which contributed about 40 percent of industry turnover in
1989 and for which annual reports have been available for the entire period. The
sample is thus biased towards relatively large and successful firms. The survey
shows, first of all, that the volume of financial sources relative to total turnover varies
2
5 - See Allen and Gale (1995: 201) for evidence that in the United States underwriting
spreads and issuance expenses do in fact decline with the size of the issuance.24
with the business cycle, irrespective of firm size. The structure of total financial
sources (flows of funds), however, differs for firms of different size (Graph 1):
2
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• Internal sources of finance are on average far more important for small firms (126
percent of total financing) than for mid-sized (102 percent) and in particular large
firms (87 percent).
• Equity finance makes a negative contribution to the financing of small (-45 per-
cent) and mid-sized (-28 percent) as opposed to large firms (3 percent).
2
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• Bank debt is more important as a source of finance for small (14 percent) and
mid-sized firms (11 percent) than for large firms (0.2 percent). This is consistent
with Rajan and Zingales (1995) who find that small German firms have greater
leverage than large firms while the opposite holds true for the US.
These main findings are confirmed by another Bundesbank study. StoB (1996), who
analyses two periods (1979-82 and 1988-93) in order to show whether restrictive
monetary policies affect the financing of German firms, finds that small firms are
more dependent on bank lending than larger firms. Yet, in periods of restrictive
monetary policies, bank lending to small firms increases despite a deterioration in
the financial indicators of these firms. Although investment of small firms is more ad-
versely affected by restrictive monetary policies than investment of larger firms, this
difference can thus not be explained by differences in bank lending.
2
8 This is con-
sistent with the results of Tsatsaronis (1995) who analyzes the transmission of
monetary impulses in four economies, finding no evidence for the existence of a
credit channel of monetary policy in Germany. Interestingly, the US would, if any-
thing, be grouped in the same category as Germany.
2
9 Mainly, StoB explains his re-
sult with the fact that creditor rights are relative well protected in Germany and that
2
6 Small firms in this sample have a turnover of less than 10 Mio. D-Mark, mid-sized
(large) firms of 10-100 Mio. (more than 100 Mio.) D-Mark.
2
7 Note that the quality of these data for smaller firms is substantially affected by the lack
of a separation between the business and private accounts of the firms' owners (DBB,
1992: 31). To the extent that profits and other equity funds were transferred to private
accounts rather than retained by the firm, the amount of equity finance is underesti-
mated.
2
8 In addition, smaller firms appear to pay higher interest rates than larger firms which can
be interpreted as a risk premium for firms with poor credit rating.
2
9 This finding contrasts to earlier studies for the US which found that small firms rely less
on bank credit (relative to trade credit) in periods of restrictive monetary policies (StoB,
. 1996).25
his sample does not include truly small, young firms. He argues that exclusive
housebank relationships cannot account for the good access of small firms to bank
credit because even small firms try to cooperate with more than one bank in order to
avoid being too dependent: Also Fischer (1990: 142) finds that the traditional house-
bank relationship is declining in importance.
While these results imply that smaller firms in Germany have fairly good access to
bank credit, a number of other studies indicates that external financing constraints of
smaller firms are to some degree binding. Winker (1996) presents evidence from a
survey of 1586 firms for the years 1980-92. Out of these firms, 6 and 27 percent, re-
spectively, mention a lack of access to debt and equity finance as constraints for in-
vestments into new, innovative technologies. Winker shows "hat the probability of a
firm to face a financial constraint declines with the size of the firm and with the im-
provement in the current business condition. Positive future expectations, in con-
trast, can hardly be signaled to potential lenders, which indicates that asymmetries
in information, are present. On an aggregated level, Winker estimates potential de-
mand and supply functions for investment credit and calculates deviations from the
actual credit volume realized on the market. He shows that credit rationing, i.e., ex-
cess demand on the German credit market, has reached up to 10 percent of the
credit volume between 1974 and 1987. Both credit demand and credit supply de-
clined in the years following 1987, causing a situation of excess supply.
A study by Audretsch and Elston (1994) similarly implies a restricted access of small
firms to outside finance. The study uses the Bonn database with financial reports of
139 firms which were quoted on the stock exchange between 1965 and 1985. An in-
vestment function, which explains current investment by lagged investment, the
firm's Tobin's q-ratio (market value/replacement cost), its cash flow, and its sales is
estimated. A significant influence of the cash flow variable on investment would indi-
cate that firms are constrained in their access to external finance, and that invest-
ment and financial decisions of a firm are not independent. For a first period (1968-
76), no liquidity problems are found in the sample, for the 1977-85-period, in con-
trast, liquidity constraints are evident for small firms (relative to the sample). It may
be concluded that evidence obtained from this sample of relatively large firms would
only strengthen if truly small firms were considered, but this definitely cannot com-
pensate for the lack of original data.26
In summary, measured by the high share of bank loans in small firm finance and the
high propensity of banks to lend to small firms even in times of monetary restraint,
small and mid-sized German firms seem to have fairly good access to bank credit. At
the same time, small firms are heavily using internal funds to finance their invest-
ments, and they seem to be constrained with respect to external (equity) finance.
There are two institutional factors which may explain these results:
First, if firms have assets which can serve as collateral at hand, lending to small
firms would occur even under asymmetric information. The relatively high propensity
of small firms to use debt finance is thus likely to be due to the fact that creditor
rights are relatively well protected in Germany. Although comparable data on the
share of credit backed by collateral is difficult to obtain, the coilateralization of loans
seems to be very high in Germany (Borio, 1995: 94). In the US, only about 80 per-
cent of all loans are backed by collateral, this share is even lower for commercial
banks (63 percent). Note, however, that heavy use of collateral may run counter to
an active role of banks in the restructuring of firms. In case of corporate financial
distress, secured creditors may have less interest in maintaining the firm as a going
concern and may rather opt for a liquidation of assets.
Second, a number of institutional factors such as the tax regime, the rigid organiza-
tional structure of publicly listed firms, and the information dissemination require-
ments can explain the low propensity of German firms to raise external equity fi-
nance (DBB, 1984). However, these factors are gradually declining in importance.
3
0
Also, it is interesting to note that the German universal banking system has played a
relatively important role in financing the emergence of new innovative firms in the
late 19th century.
3
1 Based on their evidence, it would thus be premature to conclude
that a lack of access of small German firms to venture capital is mainly the result of
banking regulations. Interestingly, commercial banks have in 1995 been the main
providers of capital for German venture capital funds, contributing 57 percent of all
sources (BVK, 1996: 110).
3
0 Since 1987, for example, German limited liability companies (GmbH) have to comply
with more stringent publication requirements, and the co-determination laws have been
adjusted in 1995 (Schmidt, 1992; DBB, 1997).
3
1 See Gall et al.(1995: 30n) on the respective history of the Deutsche Bank.27
UNITED STATES
For the US, some survey data is available which directly allows an assessment of
the role of banks in the financing of small firms. Berger and Udell (1995) analyze
data from the National Survey of Small Business Firms for the years 1988-89. The
sample includes 863 small, non-listed firms. The authors find that small firms with a
long-term relationship with banks pay lower interest rates and pledge less collateral
than firms which do not have such a bank-relationship. That is, borrowers with longer
banking relationships receive more favorable loan terms.
3
2 Also Berger, Kashyap,
and Scalise (1995) confirm that lending to small borrowers isto a large extent rela-
tionship-driven. They find that large banks which mainly base their lending decision
on financial analyses make few loans to small borrowers and that smail banks pri-
marily lend to small borrowers. This is also due to the fact, however, that banking
regulations in the US effectively prohibit lending of small banks to larger firms.
These survey results imply a similar role of relationship-driven lending to small firms
by banks in the US as compared to banks in Germany. Also aggregated data show
that small firms have higher retention ratios and a higher propensity to use long-term
bank credit than larger firms (Fazzari/Hubbard/Petersen, 1988). However, the share
of retained earnings in total finance does not vary with firm size in the US (Table 6),
i.e., the payout ratio increases with firm size.
In the US, venture capital finance has emerged since the late 1970s as a potential
alternative to universal banking. Venture capital funds often provide debt and equity
finance to firms, and they are involved in the management and consulting of firms
(Kroszner, 1996: 92). Relative to the total amount of bank credit, however, venture
capital funds are relatively small (1.22 percent in 1994) while still being greater than
in Germany (0.23 percent) (BVK, 1996; Venture Economics, 1996).
In summary, the role of banks in the financing of small firms in the US and in Ger-
many is very similar since both banking relationships and access to collateral ease
access to bank credit. At the same time, German banks appear to be more willing to
finance small firms than US banks, in particular in times of monetary restraint. Also,
leverage of small German firms is greater than of large firms. Hence, the evidence
3
2 The intensity of the banking relationship is measured by the number of years for which
a firm has bought a bank line of credit from its current lender.28
does not suggest that lending to small firms is impaired by universal banking.
Rather, institutional factors such as creditor right protection seem to have an impor-
tant impact on the willingness of banks to lend to small firms. Small German firms
rather seem to be constrained with respect to thejr access to venture capital finance.
This may explain why retained earnings are more important for small German than
for US.firms.
4.3. Banks and corporate governance
Banks can exert an influence on the corporate governance of firms through a num-
ber of different channels. They can hold debt and equity of firms, vote in sharehold-
ers meetings, and send representatives to the supervisory boards of firms. Because
of the restricted activities of US banks in these areas, this section mainly focuses on
the role of German banks in corporate governance. However, it also points out that
US banks do hold equity in non-financial firms in times of financial distress.
GERMANY
In Germany,, perhaps a bit contrary to the conventional wisdom, equity holdings of
banks in non-financial firms are not a large asset item for banks, in particular not for
all groups of banks. In mid-1996, the share of all participations of banks in other
firms (including financial firms) was slightly above 3 percent of total assets
(Graph 2), having continuously increased from less than 1 percent at the beginning
of the 1950s. About the same amount of securities is held as portfolio investments.
Taking account of the fact that about one third of the shares are participations in
banks (DBB, 1997), long-term equity ownership of banks in non-financial firms thus
accounts for about 2 percent of the banking system's assets. Table 9 shows that
equity holdings are substantially higher for large commercial banks (over 5 percent
of assets) than for other groups of banks. The large banks hold more than 50 per-
cent of all shares.
3
3 Generally, banks are a relatively small buyer group on the stock
3
3 One problem with the interpretation of these data arises because German accounting
practices lead to an underestimation ot the value of equity holdings relative to banks'
assets. Because shareholdings enter with their book rather than their market value into
the banks' balance sheets, market value accounting would reveal higher asset shares.
The annual report of the Deutsche Bank for 1994, for example, reveals that the market29
market. They held 10.3 percent of corporate equity in 1995, longer-range time series
show that their share averaged 8 percent between 1960 and 1982 (Table 7; DBB,
1984:19; 1997). Banks as a group generally own less than 25 percent of the equity
of a firm, and bank .ownership tends to be concentrated in a single bank
(Gorton/Schmid, 1996: 6). ;; ,,
German banks have acquired participations in non-financial firms mainly, through
debt-equity swaps in times of corporate financial distress and in an effort to support
companies with a weak capital base (DBB, 1984, 1987, 1997). While there is little
consistent empirical evidence on such events, Pohl (1986: 92) notes that many
commercial banks converted debt into equity during the banking and economic crisis
in Germany in the late 1920s. Surveys which focus on relatively recent acquisitions,
may thus not give a correct picture.
3
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Apart from their direct shareholdings, potential power accrues to German banks be-
cause they exercise proxy voting on behalf of their private customers. Through proxy
votes, banks represent shareholders, who deposit their shares in the bank, on the
basis of an authorization given for a maximum of 15 months. According to Cable
(1985), half of the shares in Germany are deposited in banks, and banks vote on av-




Furthermore, the German non-financial firms' board structure is one of the sustaining
columns of the often discussed power of German banks. In 1993, private banks held
6.3 percent of the supervisory board seats in Germany's 100 biggest companies
(Table 8). These board mandates have been build up already in the early 20th cen-
tury (Pohl, 1986). However, the presence of large shareholders as well as the pres-
ence of banks on most supervisory board meetings is diminishing. Bankers have re-
duced their role on the supervisory boards by accepting fewer mandates. According
value of the shares and participations held by the bank is more than four times greater
than the book value of these assets (Deutsche Bank, 1995).
3
4 The German banking association, for example, published the results of a survey of the
10 largest private banks in Germany. This survey revealed that between 1976 and
1986 in only 1 out of 20 cases was debt swapped into equity, and in 5 cases were firms
with a weak capital base supported (Cammann/Arnold, 1987: 122).
3
5 The restriction that prevents a single person or institution from having more than 5-10
percent of the votes at the general meetings does not apply to proxy voting by banks
(Gorton/ Schmid 1996: 9).30
to a study of the Monopolkommission (1978: 301 n), domestic banks held, on aver-
age, 20 percent of total supervisory board seats in 1974, In 1986, banks representa-
tives accounted for about 10 percent of the total supervisory board membership of
75 of the 92 largest industrial companies with a supervisory board (Bohrn, 1992:
231 n). This trend has continued.
The discussion of "Section 3 has shown that universal banks can be expected to
perform a corporate governance role in non-financial firms. However, empirical tests
of this hypothesis are inherently difficult to perform. If the market for corporate con-
trol is in equilibrium, differences in the performance of firms cannot be traced back to
differences in ownership structure because market mechanisms ensure that optimal
ownership structures evolve (Gorton/Schmid, 1996).
Analyses based on micro-data have been conducted only recently. Gorton and
Schmid study the effects of bank equity ownership, proxy votes, and block holdings
ofbanks on the profitability of firms. The authors test three hypotheses: (i) coinci-
dence of interest (relationship between equity holdings and performance of firms is
up#ard
csloping), (ii) opposed interests (relationship is downward sloping), (iii) in-
sider hypothesis (relationship is first downward and then upward sloping; banks be-
have as entrenched insiders over the range where performance declines). Two
cross-sections of large German firms for two points in time, 1974 (88 observations)
and 1985 (57 observations), are studied.^The results for the 1974-sample indicate no
conflicts of interest. The performance of firms increases as a function of how much
equity banks own while it is not related to proxy voting or to blockholdings of shares.
Hence, banks seem to play a positive role and to be better able than other block-
holders to improve performance. The results change for the 1985-sample. In this
sample, performance is unrelated to equity holdings and to proxy voting of banks but
it is, related to blockholdings.
The results of Schmid and Gorton seem to support the view that a potential positive
impact of bank ownership on corporate governance was merely achieved in pro-
tected financial markets and could not be sustained through periods of increased
(external) competition. This would imply that markets in Germany now provide supe-
rior substitute mechanisms of corporate control. A recent analysis of Schmid (1996)
indicates that this conclusion may be premature. He tests three hypotheses: (i) eq-
uity participations of banks have a non-negative impact on firm profitability, (ii) the31
size and structure of equity participations influence the distribution of profits on debt
and equity holders, and (iii) equity participations of banks have a negative impact on
firm profitability. Schmid's sample consists of data on 62 German joint stock compa-
nies (non-financial firms) for the year 1990 which had a participation of at least one
commercial bank. The hypothesis that banks have a negative impact on performance
is not supported.
3
6 Banks seem to receive a remuneration for their corporate control
functions through the return on debt relative to capital. Schmid concludes that re-
stricting share participation of banks in non-financial firms may reduce the banks'
interest to engage in external control and prevent the evolution of efficient ownership
structures.
A sub-sample of 91 firms from the Bonn Database has been used by Chirinko and
Elston (1996a, 1996b) to determine the impact of ownership structure on the profit-
ability of firms. Ownership is considered to be concentrated if a single stockholder
owns more than 50 percent of the shares or if two or three stockholders own more
than 75 percent. Financial institutions are assumed to have.a substantial influence
on firms if one bank (or insurance company) holds more than 50 percent of the
shares or if a financial institution is the only shareholder with an equity stake exceed-
ing 25 percent. The authors find little evidence for a substantial positive influence of
banks on the firms' profitability, but also no evidence of a negative influence. Bank-
influenced firms do not hold more bank debt, nor do they enjoy lower finance costs.
There is thus no evidence for a certification effect of bank ownership. Since, in equi-
librium, profitability of firms should not be affected by ownership structures, these
findings suggest that bank ownership has an impact on corporate control, and
serves as a substitute for concentrated non-bank ownership.
3
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Elston (1996) furthermore analyzes whether bank involvement, measured by the
ownership participation of banks, reduces the sensitivity of firms' investment deci-
sions to liquidity conditions. She asks whether cash flow is a significant determinant
of investment and, in addition, whether the significance of this variable differs ac-
3
6 More specifically, the hypothesis of a non-negative impact of banks' shareholdings on
the return of capital cannot be rejected while the hypothesis of a negative impact can-
not be confirmed.
3
7 Because banks as a group generally own less than 25 percent of the equity of a firm,
this assumption is fairly restrictive.32
cording to the bank relationship of firms. The analysis is based on a sample of 250
firms of the Bonn database. In a first period (1968-1972) studied, cash flow was not
a significant determinant of investment; only lagged investment had a significant im-
pact. The results are the same for firms owned versus firms not owned by banks. In
the second period (1973-1984), in contrast, cash flow had a significant impact on in-
vestment. Firms which were not bank-dependent faced liquidity constraints while this
was not the case for firms which were partly owned by banks.
While the above studies provide evidence for a non-negative impact of bank owner-
ship on firm performance, it has also been claimed that bank ownership has a sig-
nificantly negative impact. Perlitz and Seger (1994), for example, compare the
means of different financial variables in firms with a high potential of bank influence
versus firms with a low potential of bank influence. Potential bank influence is a
composite measure of proxy voting, board membership of bankers, and equity hold-
ings! The authors find a great potential for bank influence in a number of firms, and a
negative correlation between this variable and performance. However, their empiri-
cal approach is subject to a number of flaws. This is mainly because the negative
correlation may be due to other factors (industry characteristic, for example) which
have not been controlled for. Also, the impact of individual variables describing bank
influence cannot be isolated.
UNITED STATES
In the US, corporate governance functions are mainly performed through markets or
through pension funds which are important investors on the stock market. The num-
ber of takeovers in the US is high
3
8 while, in Germany, there have been only four
takeovers in the past 50 years.
3
9 Hence, a comprehensive assessment of the effi-
ciency of corporate governance mechanisms would require an analysis of takeovers
and pension fund activities. In this section, we rather focus on the equity holdings of
US banks.
3
8 Martin and McConnell (1991:671n) investigate 253 successful takeovers for the period
from 1958 to 1984; they qualify a takeover as successful if there was a management
turnover. For the takeover wave of the 1980s, Shleifer and Vishny (1990: 745n) report
that between 1984 and 1986 there were no less than 62 hostile takeover contests.
3
9 Interestingly, three of these took place within the last eight years.33
In the United States, just as the conventional wisdom would suggest, equity holdings
of commercial banks are almost negligible. They accounted for less than 0.5 percent
of banks' total assets at the beginning of the 1990s (Graph 2) and are thus - in view
of the large size of the stock market - de facto irrelevant with regard to the total vol-
ume of enterprise stock: Commercial banks held only 0.2 percent of corporate equity
in 1995 (Table 7). The impact of the Glass-Steagall Act on equity holdings is clearly
revealed by the data. After the implementation of the Act, equity holdings were
gradually reduced from more than 1 percent of total assets in 1934 to the low level
that they have retained since the mid 1940s.
Behind these aggregated figures, it is often overlooked that also banks in the US can
hold equity in non-financial.'firms. One exception from the general rule of the Giass-
Steagall Act that prohibits equity holdings are loan workout situations (James, 1996).
If bank debt has been rescheduled or if it has not been serviced in the past, com-
mercial banks can convert debt into equity, and no limit applies to the share of a
firm's capital that a bank can hold. Until 1980, banks could hold such equity stakes
for a maximum period of five years; this period has been extended to ten years, and
some state laws are even less restrictive. James analyzes 139 debt restructuring
cases which have taken place between 1981 and 1991. He finds that in 32 percent
of the cases, banks swapped debt into equity, and that they forgave on average 46
percent of the principal of their loans.
4
0 Banks on average became the largest
stockholders of the restructured firms, and they held the equity over several years.
James furthermore provides evidence that banks are more likely to swap debt into
equity in firms which have positive growth prospects, measured by the value of their
market-to-book value of assets. In addition, while the earnings of these firms tended
to lie below the average prior to debt restructuring, they were above average after
two years. One possible explanation is that bank ownership has. a positive impact on
performance through, for example, improved monitoring.
In summary, the empirical evidence has shown (i) that in Germany shareholdings of
large commercial banks - not necessarily of small and mid-sized banks - in non-
financial firms are higher than in the US, and (ii) that both in Germany and in the US
4
0 An important variable affecting the incentives of banks to undertake debt-equity-swaps
is the amount of public debt of a firm outstanding. If public bondholders did not restruc-
ture their claims, banks did not act unilaterally.34
banks make use of the option to swap debt into equity in firms which are under fi-
nancial distress. The empirical evidence furthermore gives weak support to the hy-
pothesis that equity ownership of banks has at least a non-negative impact of firms
performance. Yet, more micro-economic evidence is certainly needed in order to
identify the specific channels through which banks exert an (ownership) influence of
firms. At the same time, theoretical considerations and the German evidence have
shown that periods of financial distress are not the only cases in which banks may
wish to hold equity. Even under "normal" conditions, an optimal structure of corpo-
rate control is characterized by a certain amount of banks' shareholdings. Current
US legislation may thus prevent the evolution of an optimal governance structure,
thus biasing the market for corporate control towards costly takeover mechanisms.
Liberalizing equity ownership is unlikely to lead to massive investment of banks in
enterprise shares, because, as the German data show, banks have a propensity to
economize on their shareholdings.
4.4. Activities and Profitability of Commercial Banks
The different scope of activities of German and US banks should ultimately be re-
flected in differences in their balance sheet and income structure. Yet, although
tttere are some pronounced differences in the structure of the balance sheets, we




The structure of commercial banks' assets is surprisingly similar when considering
loans to customers (Table 11). These accounted for a relatively constant share of
about 60 percent of assets. Also, the structure of bank loans by recipient was almost
identical in the two economies with roughly equal shares of households (53 percent)
and businesses (47 percent) in total credit in 1993 (Borio, 1995: 70). The major dif-
ference in the asset structure of banks is the much greater holdings of German
banks of interbank deposits and the greater share of securities for US banks. These
differences persisted over time, although recent changes point into the same direc-
4
1 The year 1992 was chosen because German data since 1993 include East German
banks.35
tion. Banks in both economies reduced their holdings of cash and central bank bal-
ances, possibly as a result of improved payment systems techniques.
The major difference on the liabilities' side of the banks' balance sheet is, again, the
greater reliance of German banks on interbank deposits. Also, bond finance is more
important for German than for US banks. Consequently, US banks finance them-
selves to a much greater degree through non-bank deposits and through equity. De-
spite differences in the stocks, we again observe similar adjustments trends. Equity
and reserves, in particular, have become more important over time, possibly in re-
sponse to increased banking risks. -
 ;' "
With regard to their income structure, German and US commercial banks earned
about one third of their income from non-interest activities (Table 10). While this
share has remained relatively constant over time in Germany (about 30 percent of
gross income), US commercial banks increased their non-interest income from 22.1
to 34.5 percent during the decade under review. To a substantial degree, this in-
crease in non-interest income can be interpreted as a reflection of banks move to
off-balance sheet activities (Berger/Kashyap/Scalise, 1995: 68). Non-interest income
includes fees from issuing counterparty guarantees and derivative instruments. Boyd
and Gertler (1995) even argue that the provision of back-up lines (fee-based) pro-
vides banks with approximately the same income as direct lending.
Apart from similar structures of gross income, the profitability of German and US
banks differs quite substantially. Both in 1980 and in 1992 did US banks achieve a
return on assets (ROA) about four times greater than that of German banks.
4
2 Be-
cause of the greater capitalization of US banks, the gap in the return on equity
(ROE) has been less pronounced. US banks have thus employed their assets more
efficiently and have achieved a better profit ratio, i.e., a greater net after tax income
relative to gross income. Certainly, this finding warrants closer examination. In par-
ticular, banks of similar size and structure should be compared.
While these cross-country comparisons of income statements are potentially biased
by differences in accounting standards, the development of the ratios over time in a
particular country should not be subject to such a distortion. We again see similari-
4
2 Under the assumption that German assets are at least partly undervalued, the true
difference is even larger.36
ties between the two countries. Both in the US and in Germany have the profit ratios
of banks declined by several percentage points. Accordingly, gross income margins
and returns on assets declined, although this loss in profitability has been less pro-
nounced for German banks. Because of the increased capitalization of banks in both
economies, ROEs declined as well. Overall, these findings show that the globaliza-
tion of financial markets affects the profitability of banks everywhere and that the re-
sponses of banks follow similar patterns.
5. CONVERGENCE OF THE SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
BANKING REGULATIONS
The globalization of financial services and the deregulation of financial markets have
called into attention the role of banks for economic development and growth. Com-
mercial banks in Germany and in the US are usually thought to play a fundamentally
different role. By analyzing the structure of financial markets, bank-firm relations,
and financial statements of banks, we have shown that the differences are not as big
as they appear at first sight, that some of them have been decreasing over the past
years, and that many of them are due to differences in the overall regulatory struc-
tures of the economies.
Similarities between the German and the US financial system were mainly found with
regard to the great reliance of firms on internal sources of finance and to the impor-
tant role of commercial banks as intermediaries of external finance. Access to bank
credit is of particular importance for small firms in both economies. Interestingly, de-
spite the general prohibition of industrial shareholdings of banks in the US, banks
swap debt into equity in times of corporate financial distress in both economies.
Obviously, the major differences between the two economies is the greater role of
German banks in the corporate governance of non-financial firms which is largely
restricted by law for US banks. In addition, a greater stock market capitalization in
the US and a lower leverage of US firms set the two economies apart. There are
also differences with regard to the financing of small firms. These firms mainly use
bank debt as external sources of finance in Germany. In the US, in contrast, they
appear to have also relatively good access to external equity finance.37
Our analysis indicates that the perceived differences result basically from different
regulatory environments which, in turn, exert a strong influence on household and
firm preferences. Tax regimes, pension systems, and financial market regulations
feature prominently among these factors. Banking regulations are thus not the only
factor. There is, at the same time, a trend in both systems to assign market forces a
greater role. This trend towards deregulation consists in Germany in opening the se-
curities market, and in the US in relaxing restrictions for commercial banks to own
shares of non-financial firms and to engage in additional activities. Both economies
are likely to benefit from deregulating and converging to a system driven more by
market forces. This also implies that emerging and transition economies should no-
tice that not only banking regulations but rather - and perhaps most importantly -
related institutional reforms will shape the structure of their financial systems. The
relevant choice is not been universal and separated banking. Rather, institutional
reform requires the implementation of a framework which allows for the utilization of
the positive features of either system. Convergence implies that bank- and market-
based financial structures are not mutually exclusive but rather complement each
other.
The findings of this paper shed some light on the question how path dependent the
evolution of financial systems may be. If path dependence is a real phenomenon,
initial conditions - which may arise randomly - would have a significant impact on
the evolution of financial structures over time. Most importantly, the removal of exist-
ing regulatory or institutional differences would not lead to a convergence of finan-
cial structures. If path dependence, in contrast, is not very strong, similar institutional
structures would eventually lead to convergence. The in many respects very similar
role of banks in Germany and in the US and the observable trend towards a conver-
gence of financial structures supports the view that path dependence is not too
strong. While it is difficult to answer the question whether preferences determine
regulations, or vice versa, we are inclined to believe that the reverse causality holds.
Changing regulations will thus ultimately shape preferences, and this will lead to
convergence.
Finally, the findings of this paper suggest a number of areas for future research. For
Europe, the likely evolution of financial systems and banking structures after the in-
troduction of a single European currency should be studied. Experiences with the38
recent mergers and acquisitions in the US banking industry and with the evolution of
financial centers can provide useful insights. Moreover, the similarities between
venture capital funds and universal banking structures warrant deeper investigation.
As regards the future of the banking industry, the theoretical rationale behind off-
balance activities of banks and the empirical relevance of this type of business
should be explored.39
TABLES AND GRAPHS
TABLE 1 — BANKING REGULATIONS - BRANCHING RESTRICTIONS
GERMANY UNITED STATES
Geographic None for commercial banks; restric- Interstate branching allowed only to the
tions do apply for some-savings and extent permitted by state law (Me. Fad-
specialized banks. den Act): Interstate branching by na-
tional banks is generally not permitted.
However, bank holding companies may
own bank subsidiaries in more than one
state if expressly permitted by state law
(Douglas Amendment).
Regulatory Notification to the banking supervision Authorization by federal or state agen-
(Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kredit- cies required,
wesen) and the Bundesbank required.
Scope of permis- Unrestricted for commercial banks A commercial bank may underwrite and
sible securities within the general solvency and liquid- deal in government securities and deal
activities ity requirements. in other debt and equity securities
provided that (1) the activities are con-
ducted in a bank holding company
subsidiary; (2) the revenues of such
activities do not exceed 25 percent -
before 10 percent- of the total revenues
of the subsidiary; and (3) bank affiliates
are insulated by appropriated fire walls.
Source: Saunders and Walter (1994: 237-248).
TABLE 2— STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, 1986-1993
(AVERAGES).
Market capitalization (market value of stocks / GDP) [%]
Total value of traded shares / GDP [%]
Number of listed companies
Turnover (total value traded / market capitalization) [%]














Market concentration (share of market capitalization held by the 10
largest stocks) [%]
41 14
Source: Demirgug-Kunt/Levine (1995: 33-34).40
TABLE 3 — GROSS BOND ISSUERS IN THE US AND IN GERMANY, 1995.
Central government





















TABLE 4 — LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS ON NON-FINANCIAL
FIRM'S ACCESS TO NON-BANK FINANCE IN GERMANY.
INSTRUMENT REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS
Commercial papers and domestic bonds Issuance discouraged until 1992 by issue
authorisation procedure and securities transfer
taxes.
Euro-Bonds. Issuance abroad required prior notification of the
authorities and was subject to maturity re-
strictions until 1989. Issuance of foreign cur-
rency bonds prohibited until 1990.
Equity New share issues must be offered to existing
shareholders first. 1 percent corporation tax on
all equity issues until 1992. Secondary trading in
equities subject to securities transfer tax until
1992, ranking from 0.1 to 0.25 percent. Annual
net assets tax of 1 percent on corporate net as-
sets, payable irrespective of net income posi-
tion.
Source: Prowse (1994: 26).41
TABLES— BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURE OF NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS IN
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Source: OECD (1996b). * DBB (1993: 22-23).
Note: Due to rounding, the figures may not add up to the total.42
TABLE 6 — SOURCES OF FINANCIAL FUNDS IN US MANUFACTURING FIRMS,
1970-84.
All firms




(% of total sources of funds)
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TABLET— DISTRIBUTION OF OUTSTANDING CORPORATE EQUITY AMONG


































Other banks and insurance companies
Industry and other companies





















Source: Bundesverband deutscher Banken (1995).



































TABLE 10—INCOME STATEMENT ANALYSIS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS IN
THE US AND IN GERMANY, 1980 AND 1992.
OPERATING ASSET RATIOS





















































































































































































Source: OECD (1996a). Balance sheet totals are averages based on twelve end-month data. Be-
cause from 1993 onwards, German data include Eastern German banks, the year 1992 was
used as the relevant basis for the comparison.45
TABLE 11 —BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS,
1980 AND 1992.
ASSETS
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Source: FDIC (1993), Deutsche Bundesbank (Bankenstatistik, various issues).48
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